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Redistribution in the Current
U.S. Social Security System
Jeﬀrey B. Liebman
Social Security is the largest income-transfer program in the United States.
In 2001 the program is expected to bring in $532 billion in (noninterest)
revenue, mostlyf romp ayroll taxation of current workers, and to pay out
$439 billion, mostly in beneﬁt checks to retirees.1 Because its beneﬁt for-
mula replaces a greater fraction of the lifetime earnings of lower earners
than of higher earners, Social Security is generally thought to be progres-
sive,p roviding a better deal to low earners in a cohort than to high earners
in the same cohort. In addition, the program is considered to be particu-
larly important in preventing poverty among the lowest-income elderly.2
Jeﬀrey B. Liebman is an associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
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son,A n drew A. Samwick, and Stephen Zeldes for discussions about this research; to Joshua
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Henry Aaron, Gary Burtless, Peter Diamond, Martin Feldstein, and conference participants
forc o mments on an earlier draft; and to Hugh Richards for providing tabulations from the
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1. These numbers are for the entire Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program
(OASDI). The nondisability portion of the program (OASI) that is the focus of this paper is
projected to have (noninterest) income of $455 billion and expenditures of $378 billion.
2. Social Security Administration (2000) calculates (ignoring behavioral eﬀects) that with-
out Social Security elderly poverty would rise from 9 percent to 48 percent. Burtless (1994)
argues that social insurance programs such as Social Security are more important than
means-tested transfers in lifting families out of poverty.
11An umber of proposed Social Security reforms would increase the link
between a worker’s Social Security contributions and retirement income,
replacing or supplementing the current system with a system of deﬁned
contribution personal retirement accounts funded proportionally to earn-
ings.3 These proposals have led to concern that the amount of redistribu-
tion and poverty alleviation accomplished through Social Security would
decline if a system based on individual accounts were established.
However, much of the intracohort redistribution in the U.S. Social Secu-
rity system is related to factors other than income. Social Security trans-
fers income from individuals with low life expectancies to those with high
life expectancies, from single workers and from married couples with sub-
stantial earnings by the secondary earner to married one-earner couples,
and from individuals who have worked for more than thirty-ﬁve years to
those who have concentrated their earnings in thirty-ﬁve or fewer years.
Since high-income households tend to have higher life expectancies and
receive larger spouse beneﬁts, some of the progressivity of the basic beneﬁt
formula is oﬀset. Understanding the redistribution that occurs through the
current U.S. Social Security system is important for assessing the potential
costs of moving to a mixed Social Security system that incorporates both
pay-as-you-goandindividual-accountcomponents,andfordesigningmod-
iﬁcations to the traditional system that could complement other reforms.
The main results in this paper come from a microsimulation model of
the retirement portion of Social Security and use a data set that matches
the 1990 and 1991 Surveys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
to Social Security administrative earnings and beneﬁt records. The model
simulates the distribution of internal rates of return, net transfers, and
lifetime net tax rates that would have been received from Social Security
by members of the 1925 to 1929 birth cohorts if they had lived under
current Social Security rules for their entire lives, and ﬁnds that Social
Security provides within-cohort transfers of 13 percent of Social Security
beneﬁts when discounted at the overall cohort rate of return of 1.29 per-
cent.4 However, much of the redistribution that occurs through Social Se-
curity is not related to income, and thus income-related transfers are only
5t o9p ercent of Social Security beneﬁts paid (or $19 to 34 billion), at
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3. There is no reason why the individual accounts must be funded proportionally to earn-
ings. Feldstein and Liebman (this volume) show that by funding personal retirement accounts
with a combination of ﬂat per-worker contributions and proportional contributions, an
investment-based deﬁned contribution system can accomplish as much redistribution as the
current system, or more.
4. More speciﬁcally, within-cohort transfers are measured as the present discounted value
of Social Security beneﬁts received minus taxes paid, all discounted at the cohort rate of
return. Therefore, someone whose rate of return is greater than the cohort rate of return
receives a positive transfer, and someone whose rate of return is lower than the cohort return
receives a negative transfer. Total transfers can be calculated by summing either the positive
or negative transfers (which each sum to the same quantity).2001 aggregate beneﬁt levels.5 At higher discount rates, Social Security
appearsm orer e distributive by some measures and less redistributive by
others.
Thep aper begins in section 1.1 by presenting basic data on the annual
redistribution that occurs through Social Security, then reviews, in section
1.2, the reasons for preferring a lifetime measure of redistribution and the
sourcesof lifetimeredistribution inthe U.S.Social Securitysystem. Section
1.3 discusses the simulation model, and section 1.4 explains the methodol-
ogyu sed form e asuring lifetime redistribution. Section 1.5 provides the re-
sults on redistribution in the current system, and section 1.6 compares my
resultstothoseinrecentstudiesbyCaldwelletal.(1999),Coronado,Fuller-
ton, and Glass (2000), and Gustman and Steinmeier (2001), and discusses
implicationsoftheresultsforSocialSecurityreform.Section1.7concludes.
1.1 Annual Redistribution from Social Security
Each year, Social Security raises tax revenue from workers and pays out
beneﬁtstoretireesandotherbeneﬁciaries. Table1.1presentsestimatesfrom
the 1998 Current Population Survey (CPS) for calendar year 1998 that de-
scribe these annual ﬂows of taxes and beneﬁts for diﬀerent demographic
groups.6
The ﬁrst row of the table shows that in 1998, overall, Social Security
paid out $375 billion in beneﬁt payments and raised $430 billion in payroll
taxes. The ratio of beneﬁts to taxes was therefore 0.87. Dividing the $55
billion diﬀerence between beneﬁts and taxes by the entire U.S. population
of 272 million produces a per capita diﬀerence of $203.
As would be expected, the gap between beneﬁts received and taxes paid
diﬀers substantially across demographic groups. Individuals who are un-
der the age of eighteen receive twice as much in beneﬁts as they pay in
taxes, because few children have labor income, whereas some receive bene-
ﬁtsi ftheir parents are disabled or deceased. In contrast, individuals in the
prime working years of thirty to forty-nine years of age receive beneﬁts
that are only 8 percent of the taxes they pay. Individuals aged sixty-ﬁve
and above receive thirty times as much in beneﬁts as they pay in taxes.
Forty-six percent of Social Security beneﬁts go to people in families
whosen o n–Social Security income is below the poverty line. This result is
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5. As will be explained in detail later, income-related transfers are calculated by assigning
each individual a transfer that is the average for the individual’s level of income.
6. The CPS measures total OASDI beneﬁts and does not distinguish between retirement
and disability beneﬁts. I assume that the full incidence of the OASDI payroll tax is on the
worker and estimate OASDI payroll taxes as 12.4 percent of earnings for individuals with a
positive value in the CPS FICA variable (individuals with positive earnings and a zero value
in the FICA variable are in sectors of the economy not covered by Social Security). I multiply
each individual’s Social Security beneﬁt by 1.17 and tax payments by 0.984 so that aggregate
OASDI beneﬁts and taxes match the levels reported for calendar year 1998 in Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2001).not surprising, because Social Security represents 90 percent or more of
income for 30 percent of elderly families and 50 percent or more for 63
percent of elderly families (Social Security Administration 2000). Total
Social Security beneﬁts for females are slightly greater than those for
males, because the greater longevity for women outweighs their lower aver-
age beneﬁt levels. Due to their higher average level of earnings, men pay
Table 1.1 Annual Redistribution from the U.S. Social Security System for 1998
OASDI OASDI Ratio of Per Capita
Beneﬁts Payroll Taxes Beneﬁts to Diﬀerence
($ billions) ($ billions) Taxes ($)
All 375 430 0.87 203
Age
Under 18 3 1 2.00 18
18–29 4 74 0.05 1,575
30–49 19 248 0.08 2,736
50–64 49 97 0.50 1,231
65 301 10 29.63 8,981
Family income excluding Social
Security beneﬁts relative to
poverty threshold
Less than 50% 125 1 89.64 3,930
50–100% 48 6 7.49 1,837
100–200% 71 31 2.28 882
200–300% 43 52 0.82 218
More than 300% 88 339 0.26 1,933
Sex
Male 184 272 0.68 660
Female 191 158 1.20 233
Region
Northeast 77 87 0.89 187
Midwest 90 105 0.86 233
South 137 140 0.98 30
West 70 98 0.71 451
Race
White 334 372 0.90 168
Black 33 38 0.87 147
Asian and other 8 20 0.38 935
Hispanic status
Non-Hispanic 357 397 0.90 166
Hispanic 18 33 0.53 487
Education
Less than high school 108 30 3.57 1,616
High school 134 119 1.13 172
More than high school 132 281 0.47 1,093
Sources: Author’s calculations from the March 1999 Current Population Survey. OASDI beneﬁts and
taxes are scaled to match aggregate levels for 1998 as reported in Board of Trustees (2001). OASDI
taxes include both employer and employee share. For children under 18, the family head’s education
level is used for the tabulation by education.
14 JeﬀreyB .Liebmansubstantially more in Social Security taxes than do women. Thus, annual
Social Security beneﬁts for men are only 68 percent of taxes paid, whereas
beneﬁts for women are 120 percent of taxes paid.
Ther atio of beneﬁts to taxes paid is highest in the South, with its dispro-
portionate share of retirees, and lowest in the West, with its large share of
younger workers (including recent immigrants). Similarly, although whites
and blacks each receive beneﬁts that are roughly 90 percent of taxes paid,
demographic groups such as Asians and Hispanics (which include many
recent immigrants and relatively few elderly) pay out two to three times as
much in taxes as they receive in beneﬁts each year. Finally, individuals
in low-education groups receive on average substantially more in Social
Security beneﬁts than they pay in taxes,w hereas the reverse is true for
individuals in high-education groups. This primarily reﬂects the increase
in education levels over time in the United States (i.e., elderly Social Secu-
rity beneﬁciaries come from cohorts with lower average education levels
than do current workers).
1.2 Sources of Intracohort Lifetime Redistribution in the United States
Ther e sults on annual redistribution are interesting because they de-
scribe large annual transfers of resources among diﬀerent demographic
groups—transfers that depend mostly on the ratio of beneﬁciaries to earn-
ers within each group. Over a lifetime, however, most individuals transition
from earning income and paying Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insur-
ance (OASDI) taxes to receiving Social Security beneﬁts. Therefore, tak-
ing a lifetime perspective provides a better measure of how the U.S. Social
Security system treats diﬀerent types of individuals.
How a person fares under the Social Security system depends both on
how well he or she is treated relative to other people in his or her birth co-
hort, and on how well the birth cohort is treated as a whole. Although this
paperf ocuses on intracohort redistribution, it is important to note that
there are interactions between intercohort and intracohort redistribution.
In particular, the early cohorts of Social Security beneﬁciaries received
windfalls because they were the initial generations in a pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) system, and received substantial beneﬁts even though they had
paid relatively little in taxes. Because Social Security beneﬁts rise with
income, the largest dollar windfalls went to upper-income beneﬁciaries in
these early cohorts. As later cohorts with lower rates of return have retired,
the system has become more progressive because the increased payroll tax
rates have resulted in higher-income individuals’ paying substantially more
taxes in present-value terms than they receive in beneﬁts.7
7. Burkhauser and Warlick (1981), Hurd and Shoven (1985), Duggan, Gillingham, and
Greenlees (1993), and Steuerle and Bakija (1994) show that the higher rates of return earned
by early cohorts of Social Security beneﬁciaries led to net transfers for the system that were
often greater for high-income individuals.
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rity is its progressive beneﬁt formula. Although OASDI payroll taxes are
proportional to earnings up to a cap that is currently $80,400, the beneﬁt
formula replaces a higher fraction of lifetime earnings for low earners than
high earners. Beneﬁts are calculated by indexing earnings to average wage
growth (through the year the worker turns sixty), summing the highest
thirty-ﬁve years of earnings, and then dividing by 420 (35  12) to produce
a worker’sA verage Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). The worker’s Pri-
mary Insurance Amount (PIA)—the monthly beneﬁt the worker will re-
ceive if he or she retires at the full-beneﬁt age—is currently calculated as
90 percent of the ﬁrst $561 of AIME, plus 32 percent of AIME between
$561 and $3,381, and 15 percent of any AIME above $3,381.
This basic relationship between AIME and beneﬁt levels is altered by
two major factors. First, higher-income individuals tend to live longer (Ki-
tagawa and Hauser 1973; Rogot, Sorlie, and Johnson 1992; Pappas et al.
1993) and therefore receive beneﬁts for more years.8 Second, the aged
spouse of a retired worker is entitled to a spouse beneﬁt equal to 50 percent
of the worker’s beneﬁt while the worker is alive, and to a survivor beneﬁt
equal to the worker’s full beneﬁt after the worker dies. These beneﬁts for
spouses and survivors imply that Social Security redistributes from single
workers to married couples and from men to women. As will be shown
later, by some measures they also oﬀset some of the progressivity of the
retired worker beneﬁt because spouses of high earners receive higher
spouse beneﬁts than spouses of low earners.9
Additional redistribution occurs to individuals with short spells in cov-
ered work, such as immigrants and government workers, whose AIMEs
can substantially understate lifetime income.10 In contrast, workers with
substantial earnings in years outside their thirty-ﬁve highest years are not
rewarded by Social Security for that work. Finally, to the extent that the
rateofwagegrowthusedtoindexearningsdiﬀersfromthebenchmarkinter-
estr ateu sed to calculate redistribution, the timing of earnings throughout
8. Aaron (1977), Steuerle and Bakija (1994), and Garrett (1995) presentillustrative calcula-
tionsf or hypothetical workers that suggest that this eﬀectc an be large. Panis and Lillard
(1996) show using microdata that income transfers from whites to blacks and high-income to
low-income workers are much smaller once diﬀerential mortality is considered. In contrast,
Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees (1995) analyze mortality patterns in the Continuous
Work History Survey and conclude that diﬀerential mortality does little to oﬀset the prog-
ressivity of Social Security. For comparable research on Medicare, see McClellan and Skin-
ner (1997).
9. Boskin, Kotlikoﬀ,P u ﬀert, and Shoven (1987) present results showing how marital status
aﬀects the rates of return from Social Security.
10. See Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) for a discussion of Social Security’s treatment of
immigrants. In theory, the government pension oﬀseta nd windfall elimination provisions
reduce the extent to which workers in noncovered employment receive windfalls from Social
Security. In practice, it is often diﬃcult for the Social Security Administration to apply these
provisions, because workers do not always report their government pension income to the
Social Security Administration.
16 JeﬀreyB .Liebmanthe lifetime can aﬀect the amount of redistribution a worker receives from
the system.11
1.3 Data
This paper uses a microsimulation model based on a match of individu-
als in the 1990 and 1991 panels of the SIPP to Social Security administra-
tive earnings and beneﬁt records for those same individuals. I select SIPP
sample members who were born between 1925 and 1929, and construct
lifetime earnings and marital histories from age twenty-one through age
sixty-four using the administrative records and the SIPP topical module
on marriage. I then simulate the sample members’ Social Security payroll
taxes and beneﬁt levels under current Social Security rules (rather than
under the ones they actually experienced).
The strength of the simulation model is that it reﬂects the full range of
experience ofahistorical cohort. Because the data contain forty-three
yearso factual covered earnings for each sample member as well as com-
plete marital histories, the results give a comprehensive view of the out-
comes that would have occurred for this cohort if it had experienced these
alternative Social Security rules.12 Compared with other microsimulation
models used to study the distributional eﬀects of Social Security, this his-
torical cohort model relies little on projected or imputed data. Because I
am particularly concerned with the lower tail of the beneﬁt distribution,
my ability to observe extreme cases and to reﬂect the complicated cross-
correlations among marital status, earnings, retirement, and mortality is
important.13
Thes imulation model requires two types of imputations. First, I con-
struct earning histories for spouses who were absent at the time of the
1990–91 SIPP (due to death or divorce). Second, I impute earnings for in-
dividuals located at the taxable maximum for years in which the taxable
maximum was at a lower level relative to average wages than it is currently.
Further details of the matching and imputation methods are described in
the data appendix that appears at the end of Feldstein and Liebman (chap.
7i nthis volume).
Once complete earnings and marital histories have been constructed, it
is possible to calculate Social Security beneﬁt streams for each individual
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11. Social Security beneﬁts are partially taxable for some upper-income taxpayers. I inter-
pret this feature as part of the personal income tax system rather than the Social Security
system and do not study it here.
12. The model ignores behavioral responses to these alternative Social Security rules.
13. The drawback of analyzing a historical cohort is that future cohorts will diﬀer along
key dimensions from the 1925–1929 cohort. In particular, women will have much greater
earnings, and a larger share of individuals in later cohorts will be divorced or never married.
In section 1.6, I discuss the likely impact of these factors on the distributional impact of
Social Security.at ages 60 through 100. I assume that sample members claim beneﬁts at
their actual retirement ages (obtained from the Social Security beneﬁt re-
cords), and then calculate Social Security beneﬁts at each age from 60
through 100.14 Form arried and divorced sample members, the model cal-
culates separate beneﬁt streams corresponding to the beneﬁts the sample
member would receive if his or her spouse were still alive and if the spouse
were dead (assuming that the sample member is still alive). Expected life-
time beneﬁts can then be calculated by weighting each potential beneﬁt-
year by the probability that the sample member is alive in that year. For
married and divorced individuals, the weights on each of the two beneﬁt
streams account additionally for the probability that the spouse is alive.
To account for socioeconomic diﬀerences in mortality, I use for each race-
by-sex-by-education group separate mortality tables that were constructed
using a nonlinear least squares regression to ﬁt a standard actuarial func-
tion (the Gompertz-Makeham formula) to nonparametric, age-speciﬁc
mortality rates from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study.15
1.4 Methodology for Measuring Redistribution
This paper focuses on the redistribution in the retirement portion of
Social Security. Contributions and beneﬁts related to disability and pre-
retirement survivors are not studied.16 Including these beneﬁts would in-
crease the measured amount of redistribution to lower socioeconomic
groups; however, many Social Security reform plans would preserve dis-
ability beneﬁts at current-law levels.17 Therefore, it is the redistribution in
the retirement portion of Social Security that would most likely be aﬀected
by Social Security reform.
14. Beneﬁts vary by age because they can depend on whether the sample member’s spouse
has started receiving beneﬁts and on whether the spouse is still alive.
15. These mortality estimates were developed in joint work with Jeﬀrey Brown and Joshua
Pollet (see Brown, Liebman, and Pollet in the appendix to this volume), and are the same as
those used in Brown and in Feldstein and Liebman (chapters 10 and 7, respectively, in this
volume). We thank Hugh Richards for providing us with tabulations from the NLMS. We
produced separate mortality tables by Hispanic status as well. However, because the data
were much thinner and because the demography literature suggests that there is considerable
heterogeneity in life expectancies across Hispanic groups, I decided not to diﬀerentiate by
ethnicity in this paper. For evidence on Hispanic mortality, see Sorlie et al. (1993) and Hum-
mer et al. (1999).
16. Individuals receiving disability beneﬁts according to the data from the Social Security
Master Beneﬁciary Record are excluded from the sample. Thus, OASI beneﬁts paid to for-
merly disabled beneﬁciaries after the age-sixty-ﬁve conversion of disability beneﬁts to retire-
ment beneﬁts are not modeled.
17. Elmendorf, Liebman, and Wilcox (2001) report that the individual account–based So-
cial Security reform plans studied by the Clinton administration would have shielded Disabil-
ity Insurance (DI) beneﬁts from cuts. The NCRP plan is a notable exception that applied
beneﬁt cuts to disability beneﬁts.
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redistribution functions are closely related. Viewed from a point in time
before an individual knows his or her socioeconomic status (and therefore
the distribution from which his or her lifetime earnings, marriage, and
mortality experience will be drawn), all of the features of Social Security
that result in some workers’ receiving higher returns on their contributions
than others can be interpreted as insurance—insurance against living too
long, against having low wages, and against marrying a nonworking
spouse. From behind this veil of ignorance, all workers have the same ex
ante expected return from Social Security, and diﬀerent outcomes that
occur ex post are simply the payoﬀsf rom the social insurance; there is no
redistribution. Alternatively, one could view the program from the stand-
point of a worker who has just entered the workforce for the ﬁrst time, say,
at aget wenty-ﬁve. Based on education level, sex, and family background,
this worker has an expected distribution of future earnings, marriage, and
mortality experience. One could interpret diﬀerences in expected net bene-
ﬁtsf rom Social Security across groups deﬁned by characteristics predeter-
mined by age twenty-ﬁve (such as race, education, and sex) as redistribu-
tion,a nd within-group variation as ex post payoﬀsf rom the insurance.18
In this paper, I take a third approach and interpret Social Security as
providing insurance solely against longevity risk, and attribute other dif-
ferences in payoﬀsf rom Social Security to redistribution. In particular, dif-
ferencesinpayoﬀst oSocial Security due to diﬀerent lifetime earnings and
marriage patterns are considered to be redistribution. Diﬀerences due to
expected mortality (from age twenty-one on), deﬁned within sex-by-race-
by-education groups, are also interpreted as redistribution.19 Diﬀerences
in payoﬀs due to diﬀerences in the ex post mortality experienced by indi-
viduals within the sex-by-race-by-education groups are not considered re-
distribution and are integrated out by averaging over the possible dates of
death with appropriate probability weights.
To implement this concept, I use three measures of redistribution. The
ﬁrst is the internal rate of return, r, that equalizes the present discounted






















18. Some of the results in Feldstein and Liebman (this volume) can be interpreted in this
way.Ac omplete accounting of the beneﬁts expected from Social Security at age twenty-ﬁve
would also incorporate the disability and young survivors’ beneﬁts that are omitted from
my analysis.
19. This portion of the redistribution through Social Security is common to any system
that requires everyone to annuitize at a single price. Brown (this volume) discusses the redis-
tribution that would occur in an individual account–based system that required everyone to
annuitize at a single price.
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taxes, and S represents the probability of surviving to a given age.
Thes econdi sthe net transfer received from Social Security, a dollar























Speciﬁcally, the net transfer is the present discounted value of the individ-
ual’s lifetime Social Security beneﬁts minus the present value of the indi-
vidual’s lifetime taxes, discounted at a rate rd and measured as of age sixty-
ﬁve.I no r der to focus on within-cohort redistribution, the main results in
this paper discount at the cohort rate of return, which for this cohort under
the assumptions described below turns out to be 1.29 percent. Therefore,
an individual who receivese xactly the cohort rate of return on his or her
Social Security taxes will have a net transfer of zero, whereas someone
with a rate of return higher than that of the cohort will receive a positive
transfer, and someone with a lower rate of return will receive a negative
transfer. I also show results for real discount rates of 3 and 5 percent.
The third measure of redistribution is the lifetime net tax rate from So-
cial Security. This is simply the net transfer divided by the present dis-
counted value of lifetime earnings.
Three details about the contribution and beneﬁt streams aﬀect the re-
sults. First, because only individuals who survive to the age at which they
arei n terviewed in the SIPP are in the sample, I scale up the Social Security
contributions of sample members to reﬂect the probability that a person
in his or her sex-by-race-by-education group would not live to each age.
Therefore, group averages on rates of return or transfers can be interpreted
as the expected return for all individuals in that group who were alive as
of aget wenty-one (to facilitate comparisons with previous studies, all of
the present discounted values thatIpresent are accumulated forward to
age sixty-ﬁve).
Second, in order that the results reﬂect the U.S. Social Security system
in a steady state rather than one in which the rates of return earned by
diﬀerent cohorts are changing, and that the results be comparable to stud-
ies that focus on Social Security reforms that would be implemented over
the coming century, I calibrate the life expectancies and payroll tax rates
to reﬂect conditions in 2075 (the endpoint of the Social Security actuaries’
seventy-ﬁve-year horizon). In particular, I scale my estimated sex-by-race-
by-education mortality tables to be consistent with the Social Security Ad-
ministration’s projections for individuals born in 1990, and I assume a pay-
roll tax rate of 15.4 percent, which is roughly the payroll tax rate that
would be necessary to support the portion of OASI beneﬁts modeled in
20 JeﬀreyB .Liebmanthis paper.20 Under these assumptions, the overall internal rate of return
from Social Security for my simulation cohort is 1.29 percent.21
Third, because my unit of observation is the individual, I must allocate
the payroll taxes and Social Security beneﬁts of married couples across
the two spouses. In years during which a married couple is married, I split
the total payroll tax paid by the two spouses equally. Similarly, during
retirement years in which both spouses are alive, the total Social Security
beneﬁts received by the couple are split equally into the beneﬁt streams of
each spouse. However, during years before the couple was married, the
entire contribution of each spouse stays in the contribution stream of the
spouse making the contribution, and Social Security beneﬁts receivedafter
one spouse is dead are credited only to the surviving spouse. This approach
implies that (except for diﬀerential earnings before marriage) the entire
diﬀerence in rates of return and transfers between two spouses comes from
the longer life expectancy of the wife.22
One last methodological issue needs attention. In examining the rela-
tionship between redistribution from Social Security and lifetime income,
the particular deﬁnition of income used to classify individuals can have a
large impact on the results. I use two diﬀerent lifetime income measures
based on earnings histories. The ﬁrst is the AIME of the higher earner in
the household. The AIME is the measure of income used by the Social
Security beneﬁt formula and is calculated by summing the highest thirty-
ﬁve yearso fe a rnings (wage-indexed and including zeros, if any) for the
workera nd dividing by 420 (35  12). I use only the higher earner’s AIME
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20. Of the total 19.9 percent of payroll in OASDI costs that are forecast for 2075 (Board of
Trustees 1999), 2.59 percent are for DI beneﬁts, roughly 0.28 percent are for young survivors
(including children), and roughly 1.6 percent are OASI beneﬁts at ages sixty-ﬁve and above
forp eople who converted from DI beneﬁts when they reached the full-beneﬁt age. The DI
estimate comes directly from Board of Trustees (1999). The other two estimates rely on Table
II.H2 in the 1999 trustees’ report, which provides estimates of the number of beneﬁciaries
of each type in future years and weights these estimates by the average beneﬁt levels for each
type of beneﬁciary in 1997 from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bul-
letin.
21. This is similar to the long-run growth rate of the tax base of 1.1 percent that is assumed
by the actuaries. One reason my estimate is larger is that my sample contains many more
one-earner couples than the population retiring in 2075 will likely contain.
22. The approach I take in this paper is appealing because it shows women receiving a
higher rate of return from Social Security than men, as their longer life expectancy would
imply. Two other plausible approaches are less satisfactory. One would be to credit each
spouse with only his or her own tax contributions and Social Security beneﬁt. This would
result in much higher measured rates of return for women (inﬁnite in the case of nonworking
spouses) and low rates of return for men, because it would give them no credit for the spouse
beneﬁts produced by their earnings history. This would be unsatisfactory because the men
in marriedc o uples are clearly beneﬁting from their spouses’ receiving enhanced beneﬁts.
Another approach would be to credit men with the entire beneﬁt produced by their earnings
histories, including the spouse beneﬁt. This approach is unsatisfactory because it would cal-
culate the rates of return for many wives as zero even though they are getting a “very good
deal” from Social Security.fort wo reasons: First, the AIME of the higher earner is likely to be a good
measure of a household’s socioeconomic class and will not be confounded
by the large variation in the earnings levels of secondary earners. Indeed,
because most higher earners work full-time for at least thirty-ﬁve years,
this measure is similar to the potential earnings measures used in the stud-
ies by Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2000) and Gustman and Stein-
meier (2001). Second, for most couples, the Social Security beneﬁt they
receive depends only on the AIME of the highest earner, providing no
marginal beneﬁt for work by the lower-earning spouse.23 Thus, the AIME
is the income measure around which the explicit redistribution in the So-
cial Security system is based.
Thes econdm e asure I use is the total covered earnings of both members
of the couple (accumulated to age sixty-ﬁve at the relevant discount rate).
Thea ppeal of this second measure is that it allows for comparison with
the many studies that analyze the impact of government programs on the
income distribution using actual rather than potential income data, and it
also corresponds to the Social Security tax base. This second measure of
income may not, however, be satisfactory for welfare analysis, because a
nontrivial portion of the variation in this measure is due to the labor-
leisure (or market production versus home production) choice of the sec-
ondary earner and not simply to the earnings potential of the household.
1.5 Redistribution in the Current System
1.5.1 Overall Redistribution
The theoretical progressivity of the Social Security system can be seen
in ﬁgure 1.1, which abstracts from all of the nonincome sources of redistri-
bution by graphing the relationship between AIME and net transfers from
Social Security for a hypothetical set of single adults with diﬀerent earn-
ings levels but identical timing of earnings throughout their lifetimes and
identical life expectancies.24 Forc omparisonw ith the results to come, the
transfers are calculated discounting at a 1.29 percent rate, which matches
the aggregate internal rate of return on Social Security for the microsimu-
lation sample, and the mortality table used is the average of those for white
males and white females. Initially, transfers rise with income, as the Social
Security beneﬁt formula replaces 90 percent of the ﬁrst $505 dollars of
monthly earnings, reaching a maximum net present value of roughly
23. The Social Security Administration reports that 63 percent of women beneﬁciaries
currently receive no marginal beneﬁt from their own earnings and that this percentage is
expected to fall to 40 percent in 2060 (National Economic Council 1998).
24. In a steady-state Social Security system in which the rate of return on Social Security
is equal to the rate of wage growth, the timing of earnings would not matter.
22 JeﬀreyB .Liebman$38,000 at an annualized AIME of $6,060.25 Then they fall with income,
ﬁrst at a relatively gradual rate during the range over which the beneﬁt
formula replaces 32 percent of earnings, and then at a more rapid rate
after the second bend point. Transfers are mostly negative in this ﬁgure
because the single adults are not beneﬁting from spouse beneﬁts. For an
individual with an annualized AIME of $50,000, the net transfer is
$150,000.
Figure 1.2 shows the actual distribution of net transfers from Social
Security with a discount rate of 1.29. In contrast to the striking theoretical
relationship between income and net transfers from Social Security in the
previous ﬁgure, ﬁgure 1.2 reveals that transfers can diﬀer widely at a given
levelo fh ousehold head AIME. Moreover, a substantial number of high-
income individuals receive greater transfers than the typical low-income
individual does. For example, 19 percent of individuals in the top AIME
quintile receive transfers that are greater than the average transfer for
people in the lowest AIME quintile, and 23 percent of top quintile individ-
uals receive transfers that are greater than the average transfer received by
people in the second lowest quintile.
Some of the variation in transfers at a given level of AIME can be attrib-
uted to the diﬀerence between the transfers received bym e na n dw o m e n
25. The portion in which transfers rise with income can be thought of as similar to the
phase-in region of the earned income tax credit in that it limits the amount of transfers to
people with very small earnings who are likely to be unusual cases rather than full-time
working poor.
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Fig. 1.1 Net transfers from Social Security for hypothetical single adults
Source: All ﬁgures are derived from author’s calculations from a match of the 1990 and 1991
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to Social Security administra-
tive records.in the same household—the wives receive larger transfers due to their
longer life expectancies. This source of variation is highlighted in panels
Aa nd Bo fﬁ gure 1.3, which separates the male and female observations
from ﬁgure 1.2 into separate plots. However, substantial variation remains
in transfers at a given AIME even when one looks only at males. This
variation is due to diﬀerences in life expectancies, marital status, the level
of earnings of secondary earners, the share of earnings earned in years
outside of the highest thirty-ﬁve years, and the timing of earnings over
the lifetime.
Despite the wide spread of transfers at a given level of annualized
AIME, it is important to emphasize that the kernel regression line in ﬁgure
1.2 showing mean transfers at a given level of income declines steadily
with income (although the decline is not nearly as steep as the theoretical
decline shown in ﬁgure 1.1). The regression line reaches a maximum of
around $33,000 at an annualized AIME of $8,000 and falls to roughly
$25,000 at $50,000 of annualized AIME.
Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of internal rates of return from Social
Security for the same sample. The average internal rate of return falls from
around 4p ercent down to around 1 percent as incomes rise. As with the
transfer plots, there is wide variation in internal rates of return at a given
levelo fAIME.
As discussed above, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of income can lead to diﬀerent
interpretations of the strength of the relationship between income and the
24 JeﬀreyB .Liebman
Fig. 1.2 Net transfers from Social Security by income, all individuals
Source: See ﬁgure 1.1.
Note: The points have been randomly jittered to preserve conﬁdentiality.transfers from Social Security. In ﬁgure 1.2, many of the individuals receiv-
ing very low transfers are people in married couples in which the second-
arye a rner has substantial earnings. If the earnings of these secondary
earners were included in the deﬁnition used for ranking household income,
then these low-transfer families would be considered to have higher in-
comes, and the transfers would appear more progressive overall. Figure
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Fig. 1.3 Net transfers from Social Security by income: A, males; B, females.
Source: See ﬁgure 1.1.
Note: The points have been randomly jittered to preserve conﬁdentiality.
A
B1.5 shows transfers graphed against the total average annual earnings of
both spouses. In addition to including the earnings of both spouses, it also
includes all years of earnings, not just the highest thirty-ﬁve. The spread
of transfers at a given level of earnings is now much tighter, largely because
people with low returns due to a large amount of earnings that produce
little or no marginal Social Security beneﬁts are now classiﬁed as having
higher earnings. To the extent that variations in earnings from secondary
earners reﬂects a choice between home and market production rather than
ad i ﬀerence in earning capacity, this total earnings measure of income may
26 JeﬀreyB .Liebman
Fig. 1.4 Internal rates of return from Social Security by income
Source: See ﬁgure 1.1.
Note: The points have been randomly jittered to preserve conﬁdentiality.
Fig. 1.5 Net transfers from Social Security by income, all individuals
Source: See ﬁgure 1.1.
Note: The points have been randomly jittered to preserve conﬁdentiality.bealesss atisfactory metric for ranking people than the measure based on
the AIME of the primary earner.
The diﬀerence between the two measures of income can be seen in the
ﬁrst part of table 1.2, which presents internal rates of return, mean trans-
fers, and lifetime net tax rates by income quintile under the two deﬁnitions
of income. The ﬁrst column presents the average annual earnings by
quintile. The numbers for all beneﬁciaries and for the AIME quintiles are
the AIME of the highest earner in the household, and therefore corre-
spond to the results in ﬁgures 1.2 through 1.4. The last ﬁve rows use the
total earnings measure, as in ﬁgure 1.5. Note that the average income un-
der the more comprehensive measure can be lower than that in the less
comprehensive measure because it is averaged over more years. The sec-
ondc o lumn presents the average internal rate of return from Social Secu-
rity by income quintile. These average rates of return are person weighted,
not dollar weighted, and therefore the average internal rate of return for
all beneﬁciaries (1.53 percent) exceeds the aggregate cohort rate of return
(1.29 percent) mentioned above. Rates of return range from 2.70 to 0.85
for the AIME measure of income, and from 3.06 to the 0.35 for the total
earnings measure. Thus low-income individuals clearly receive ah i gher
rate of return from Social Security than higher-income individuals, and
the diﬀerence between the rates of return of high-income and low-income
individuals is greater when the individuals are ranked by total earnings
than when they are ranked by the AIME of the primary earner.
Ther e maining six columns in the ﬁrst part of table 1.2 show the net
transfer from Social Security evaluated at age sixty-ﬁve and the lifetime
net tax rate from Social Security. Results from each of these two measures
arep r esented using discount rates of 1.29 percent (the cohort internal rate
of return), 3 percent, and 5 percent. The lifetime net tax rate is calculated
by dividing the net transfer from Social Security by the present value of
lifetime covered earnings.26
At a discount rate of 1.29 percent, individuals in the lowest AIME
quintile receive $26,375 more in Social Security beneﬁts than they pay in
taxes, and those in the 2nd quintile receive a net transfer of $17,932. In
contrast, individuals in the highest AIME quintile pay $33,571 more in
taxes than they receive in beneﬁts. Those in the lowest quintile receive a
net subsidy from Social Security equal to 6 percent of lifetime earnings,
and those in the 2nd quintile receive a net subsidy of 1.7 percent, while
those in the highest quintile face a net tax from Social Security equal to 2
percent of lifetime earnings.
It is worth noting that the composition of the lowest AIME quintile is
26. Because the denominator in this calculation is covered earnings, the lifetime net tax
rates rise monotonically by income group. A measure of lifetime net tax rates that included
earnings above the maximum level on which Social Security taxes are assessed would start
to decline at income levels above the taxable maximum.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.quite diﬀerent from that of the other quintiles. Of the primary earners in
the ﬁrst quintile, 56 percent had fewer than thirty-ﬁve years of work in
covered employment, compared with 22 percent in the 2nd quintile, 13
percent in the 3rd quintile, and less than 2 percent in the 4th and 5th
quintiles. Of people in the 1st quintile, 20 percent are immigrants, com-
paredw ith5p ercent in the other four quintiles. As Gustman and Stein-
meier (1998) have shown, immigrants receive a very good deal from Social
Security because they are credited with zeros in their earnings records for
the years before they came to the United States, thereby appearing to have
low lifetime earnings and beneﬁting from Social Security’s progressive
beneﬁt formula. Many of the nonimmigrants in this 1st quintile are likely
to have worked in noncovered sectors of the economy, and therefore their
yearsw ithz ero earnings are not true zeros.27 Thus, an argument could be
made for ignoring the results for the lowest-income quintile and focusing
on the remaining four quintiles.
At higher discount rates, all income quintiles have negative transfers
from Social Security on average, and the spread between the average trans-
fers at diﬀerent income levels grows. For example, at a discount rate of
1.29, there is a $51,000 diﬀerence in net transfers between the 2nd and 5th
AIME quintiles; at a discount rate of 3 percent, this diﬀerence reaches
$109,000; and at a discount rate of 5 percent it reaches $218,000. With the
higher discount rates, lifetime net tax rates are positive at all income levels,
butthe variationinlifetime taxratesby incomelevelsfallssince withhigher
discount rates the progressive beneﬁts (which occur later than the taxes)
arer educed in importance relative to the proportional Social Security tax.
Thes econdp arto ft able 1.2 presents the analogous results broken down
by sex, race, and level of education. As would be expected due to their
lower mortality rates, women receive substantially larger transfers and
rates of return than men. Discounted at the cohort rate of return of 1.29
percent, the average transfer for women is $37,047, while the average for
men is $43,108. Women receivear ateo fr eturn on the Social Security
contributions of their household of 2.18 percent, compared with 0.78 per-
cent for men.
Surprisingly, diﬀerences in transfers across race and education groups
areg e nerally not statistically signiﬁcant, and diﬀerences in rates of return
for these categories are only of borderline signiﬁcance. For example, blacks
receive an internal rate of return of 1.64 percent, compared to 1.52 percent
forw hites. The ﬁrst column shows that AIMEs do diﬀer substantially by
raceand education, but the progressive beneﬁt formula is completely oﬀset
by the higher mortality in the lower-income groups. This can be seen
27. I attempted to exclude government workers (who in the past were not covered by Social
Security) from my sample by dropping observations for individuals who could be identiﬁed
in the SIPP work history topical module as having worked in the public sector or who were
receiving income from a government pension. However, this procedure presumably did not
identify all workers with public-sector experience.
30 JeﬀreyB .Liebmanclearly in table 1.3, which reproduces selected internal rate of return and
net transfer results from table 1.2 and then adds results using mortality
tables that vary only by sex (and not by race or education).28 Whereas rates
of return in diﬀerent race and education groups are indistinguishable once
diﬀerential mortality is accounted for, with uniform mortality rates low-
income groups, such as blacks and people with less than high school edu-
cation,h aveh i gher internal rates of return and transfers than the groups
with higher average earnings.
In both sets of columns, Hispanics have returns and transfers signiﬁ-
cantly above those for whites and blacks. In this cohort, a large share of
the Hispanics are immigrants, and as mentioned above, the progressive
beneﬁt formula strongly advantages immigrants with short periods of cov-
ered employment. In fact, the transfers for Hispanic immigrants are likely
to be understated in these results. While precise lifetables for U.S. Hispan-
ics are diﬃcult to construct, the available evidence suggests that U.S. His-
panics (particularly Hispanic immigrants) have lower mortality rates than
those for non-Hispanic whites, and my results do not take into account
these lower mortality rates.29
28. Speciﬁcally, all men are assigned the white male mortality table and all women are
assigned the white female mortality table.
29. For evidence on Hispanic mortality, see Sorlie et al. (1993) and Hummer et al. (1999).
Table 1.3 The Impact of Diﬀerential Mortality on the Redistribution from Social Security
Using Mortality Tables that Vary Using Mortality Tables that Vary
byAge,Sex,Race,andEducation by Only Age and Sexa
Internal Net Transfer Internal Net Transfer
Rate of at 1.29% Rate of at 1.29%
Return (%) Discount Rate Return (%) Discount Rate
White 1.52 205 1.59 3,174
(0.03) (1,456) (0.03) (1,390)
Black 1.62 2,514 2.19 18,259
(0.12) (4,241) (0.11) (3,453)
Hispanicb 2.46 14,249 2.70 22,664
(0.19) (4,860) (0.18) (4,461)
Less than high school 1.63 810 1.88 12,103
(0.05) (2,162) (0.05) (1,939)
High school 1.46 693 1.52 1,905
(0.04) (2,119) (0.04) (2,008)
More than high school 1.46 10 1.35 8,355
(0.06) (3,371) (0.07) (3,483)
Source: See table 1.2.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
aApplies mortality tables for all white males and females to entire population.
bCan be any race.
Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System 311.5.2 Factors Oﬀsetting Income-Related Redistribution
Table 1.4 contains results analyzing the extent to which spouse and sur-
vivor beneﬁts and diﬀerential mortality reduce the amount of income-
related redistribution accomplished by Social Security. The ﬁrst column of
the table contains the present value of Social Security taxes for each in-
come quintile.30 Thes econdc o lumn contains the present value of Social
Security beneﬁts under two counterfactual assumptions. First, it calculates
Social Security beneﬁts with individuals receivingonlytheir retiredworker
beneﬁt and not spouse or survivor beneﬁt. Second, it assumes that mortal-
ity rates vary only bys e xa n da g eand not by race and education. Thus,
this column describes what the distribution of Social Security beneﬁts
would be if diﬀerential mortality and spouse and survivor beneﬁts did
note xist.
Then ext two columns remove each of these two counterfactual assump-
tionso ne at a time. Column (3) shows beneﬁt levels with spouse and sur-
vivor beneﬁts added in, but retaining the counterfactual assumption that
mortality rates vary only by sex and age. Thus, the diﬀerence between
column (3) and column (2) shows the impact of spouse and survivor bene-
ﬁts. Because spouse beneﬁts are 50 percent of the beneﬁt of the retired
worker to whom the spouse is married, and survivor beneﬁts are 100 per-
cent of the beneﬁt of the deceased retired worker, the size of these beneﬁts
is higher for those in the higher AIME quintiles. On average, individuals
in the lowest AIME quintile gain $27,776 from the introduction of spouse
and survivor beneﬁts, individuals in the middle quintile gain $46,889, and
individuals in the highest AIME quintile gain $52,158. Thus one could
argue that the Social Security system implicitly values the time out of the
labor force of women married to high-earning men more than that of
women married to lower earners.
Viewed as a percentage increase, however, spouse and survivor beneﬁts
simply lead to an equal percentage increase in beneﬁts across most of the
quintiles, with a somewhat higher percentage increase in the beneﬁts of
the lowest-earning group. The bottom panel of the table shows beneﬁt
levels for each earnings quintile scaled so that the beneﬁts for each group
in column (2) equal 100. Introducing spouse and survivor beneﬁts in-
creases beneﬁt levels by about 30 percent in the four highest quintiles and
by about4 0p ercent in the lowest quintile. Thus, in evaluating the distribu-
tional implications of spouse and survivors beneﬁts, one needs to have in
mind a speciﬁc alternative for the extra revenue if it were not used for
30. These are the same values for Social Security taxes that underlie the basic results in
tables 1.1 and 1.2. Mortality assumptions aﬀect Social Security tax payments because my
model incorporates the impact of mortality before age sixty-ﬁve. However, because the im-
pact of diﬀerent mortality assumptions on the present value of Social Security taxes paid by









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.these beneﬁts. If the alternative were a proportional increase in all beneﬁts
orar eduction in the payroll tax, spouse beneﬁts would have little impact
on the amount of redistribution that occurs through Social Security. If the
alternative is to raise the beneﬁts or reduce the taxes of each beneﬁciary
by an equal dollar amount, then spouse and survivor beneﬁts cause sub-
stantial redistribution toward high-income households.
Diﬀerential mortality has a smaller impact on beneﬁts levels, causing
average lifetime beneﬁts to fall in the lowest AIME quintile by about
$3,330, or about 2 percent. In contrast, beneﬁts rise in the highest AIME
quintile by $2,424, or about 1 percent. These eﬀects are somewhat smaller
than the eﬀects on education and race groups shown in table 1.3 because
the income groups contain a mixture of the various race and education
groups. Recent research by Deaton and Paxson (2001) suggests that in-
come has a direct impact on mortality independent of race and education.
Incorporating this direct eﬀecto fincome would increase the eﬀecto fdif-
ferential mortality on the beneﬁt levels of the diﬀerent income quintiles.
1.5.3 How Much Income-Related Redistribution is There?
The scatter plots and means make it clear that there is both a substantial
amount of income-related redistribution occurring through Social Security
and a substantial amount of redistribution that is not income related.
However, the results presented so far do not provide a clear measure of
the redistribution’s total magnitude. While no summary measure of redis-
tribution is perfect, a sense of the total magnitude is useful for understand-
ing how important the income redistribution from Social Security is rela-
tive to other U.S. income-transfer programs and for considering how large
an income-based transfer system would be needed to supplement an indi-
vidual account-type Social Security system in order to preserve the current
levelo fincome-based redistribution.
The ﬁrst row of table 1.5 shows that the present value of total Social
Security beneﬁts per birth year in my simulations is $460 billion.31 Adding
up the total transfers receivedb yi ndividuals receiving more than the co-
hort rate of return (which is also equal to the negative transfers of those
receiving less than the cohort rate of return) results in total transfers of
$60 billion, roughly 13 percent of total beneﬁts. To measure the portion of
these transfers that are income related, I replace each individual’s transfer
with the predicted transfer for a person of that income estimated by the
kernel regression lines through the scatter plots in ﬁgures 1.2 and 1.5.32
Adding up the income-related transfers calculated in this way produces an
31. This is an average over the ﬁve birth years, in 1999 dollars, discounting at the cohort
rate of return of 1.29 percent.
32. An equivalent way to describe this measure of income-related transfers is that it is the
total of all the transfers from individuals at income levels above the point where the average
transfer becomes negative to people at income levels below that point.
34 JeﬀreyB .Liebmanestimate of $23 billion in income-related transfers under the AIME mea-
sure of income and $42 billion under the total-income measure of redistri-
bution, suggesting that between 38 and 70 percent of Social Security trans-
fers and between 5 and 9 percent of Social Security beneﬁts go for income-
related transfers. OASI beneﬁt payments in 2001 are projected to be $373
billion dollars. Therefore, 5 to 9 percent would be between $19 and $34 bil-
lion of annual income-related transfers.
This measure of income-related transfers is quite sensitive to the dis-
count rate used. At a discount rate of 3 percent, income-related transfers
are between 17 and 23 percent of beneﬁts, while at a discount rate of 5
percent they are between 42 and 54 percent.33 This result is closely related
to the point made earlier about the important interactions between in-
tercohort and intracohort redistribution. When the interest rate used to
discount Social Security beneﬁts and taxes is lower than the cohort rate of
return (as was the case for some early generations of beneﬁciaries), dollar
measures of intracohort redistribution look regressive, because a large
share of the windfalls go to upper-income beneﬁciaries with high beneﬁt
levels. In contrast, when the discount rate is above the cohort rate of re-
turn, dollar measures of the progressivity of the system show the high-
33. For discount rates above 1.29 percent, aggregate transfers are negative rather than zero.
For these calculations, transfers for each individual are measured relative to the average
dollar transfer for the cohort.
Table 1.5 Measuring Aggregate Income-Related Redistribution from Social Security
1.29% Discount Rate 3% Discount Rate 5% Discount Rate
Share of Share of Share of
Total Beneﬁts Total Beneﬁts Total Beneﬁts




birth year 460 100 396 100 342 100









income 42 9 90 23 185 54
Source: See table 1.2.
Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System 35income individuals who pay higher amounts of taxes losing the most from
the low return on these tax payments.
In interpreting these results it is important to remember that the income
transfers from Social Security diﬀer in a number of important ways from
transfers in other programs. First, because Social Security transfers vary
so much at each income level, crediting Social Security for accomplishing
the mean transfer at each income level exaggerates its eﬀectiveness relative
to other income-transfer programs that give everyone at a given income
level the intended transfer.34 That said, there are also advantages of trans-
fers through Social Security. Lifetime income is almost surely a better mea-
sure of a person’s true ability than income in a single year, and it is possible
that redistribution that occurs after retirement results in less distortion of
labor supply than redistribution that occurs during working years. More-
over, some of the redistribution that occurs for non–income-related rea-
sons, like rewarding people with long life expectancies, could be desirable
if the goal is to ensure a constant replacement rate throughout retirement.
1.6 Discussion
Threeo ther papers have recently provided evidence on the amount of
redistribution occurring through Social Security.35 Although the papers
use diﬀerent microsimulation models and often present diﬀerent measures
of redistribution, the results, when comparable, are quite similar to the
ones in this paper and together suggest a consistent picture of Social Secu-
rity’s distributional eﬀects. Caldwell et al. (1999) use a microsimulation
model based on projections of marriage and earnings patterns for postwar
generations. The net tax rates that they calculate for the 1990 birth cohort
(the cohort whose mortality patterns my results are calibrated to) range
from 6.2 percent in the ﬁrst income decile to 8.9 percent in the 6th income
decile (and then fall in the upper deciles because their measure of income
is not capped at the Social Security taxable maximum).36 These net tax
rates are somewhat lower than mine because Caldwell et al. assume a 14.6
percent OASI payroll tax in the long run, while I assume a 15.4 percent
tax rate. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) use a microsimulation model
based on the Health and Retirement Survey. They emphasize that Social
Security looks less progressive after one groups individuals into house-
34. That is, the added variance from the Social Security transfers reduces utility relative
toat r ansfer that provided everyone at the income level with the mean transfer for that
income level.
35. The main work on all three of these projects occurred contemporaneously with my
work,a nd the various authors were not aware of each other’s projects until the papers were
ﬁrst presented.
36. These results come from discounting ata5p e r c e n tr a t eo freturn.
36 JeﬀreyB .Liebmanholds and adjusts for variation in secondary earner levels than it does when
onel ooks simply at retired worker beneﬁts. Using a family measure of
lifetime income that averages only those years with signiﬁcant earnings,
they ﬁnd that the redistribution from Social Security increases beneﬁts in
the 2nd decile by 7 percent and reduces them by 7 percent in the 9th
decile. Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2000) project future earnings and
marriage patterns for a PSID-based sample. Ranking households by po-
tential earnings and taking into account the fact that wages above the
taxable maximum are not taxed, they conclude that, at a suﬃcientlyh i g h
discount rate, Social Security is slightly regressive.
There are two important implications of my ﬁndings for Social Security
reform.F irst, they suggest the magnitude of redistribution that an individ-
ual account–based plan would need to achieve in order to maintain the
current level of redistribution from rich to poor. If distributionally neutral
individual accounts completely replaced Social Security, the equivalent of
$20 to $30 billion per year of redistribution from people with high lifetime
earnings to people with low lifetime earnings would be required to main-
tain current levels of redistribution. In a distributionally neutral mixed
plan in which individual accounts were responsible for only around one-
third of the retirement income from Social Security, the equivalent of $7
to $10 billion per year in transfers would be required. However, because
most individual account plans would mandate at least partial annuitiza-
tion,s uch plans would not be distributionally neutral and would produce
the same redistribution from short-lived to long-lived groups that occurs
in the current system. This means that several billion additional dollars of
transfers would be needed in an individual account plan in order for it to
match the redistribution of the current system. Such transfers could be
implemented in many ways. For example, contributions to individual ac-
counts could be made in a redistributive way; payouts from the accounts
of high earners could be taxed to subsidize payouts from the accounts of
low earners; or general revenues could be used to provide supplemental
payments to lower earners.
Thes econdi m plication of these results for Social Security reform is
that if no explicit steps are taken in an individual account–based plan to
redistribute to groups with low life expectancies, then these groups could
endu pd oing substantially worse than they do under the current system.
In particular, blacks and high school dropouts currently receive rateso f
return from Social Security that are roughly the same as the population
average, because the progressive beneﬁt formula oﬀsets the impact of their
relatively high mortality rates. If an individual account–based plan re-
quired annuitization at a single price for everyone in the population, then
the same eﬀecto fm o rtality on beneﬁt payments would occur as in the
current system, but there would not be the progressive beneﬁt formula to
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would be one way to ensure that these groups are not made worse oﬀ by
Social Security reform. Other ways of oﬀsetting the mortality eﬀects in-
clude providing for bequests and coming up with suﬃcient additional re-
sources in funding the account so that retirement income levels are pre-
served (see Feldstein and Liebman, chapter 7 in this volume).
In addition, these ﬁndings raise the question of how the Social Security
beneﬁt formula might be modiﬁed to align its distributional impact more
closely with the theoretical impact shown in ﬁgure 1.1. There are two as-
pects to this modiﬁcation: changing the average level of redistribution at
diﬀerent income levels and reducing the spread of transfers at a given in-
come level. It would be relatively straightforward to increase transfers at
low income levels and reduce them at higher income levels. The 90 percent
factor in the PIA formula could be increased and the 32 and 15 percent
factors reduced. Alternatively, if the goal was to concentrate the beneﬁt
increase on low earners, but not the atypical low earners in the 1st quintile,
the range over which the 90 percent beneﬁt factor applies could be ex-
tended, or a fourth range between 90 and 32 could be introduced.
Reducing the variation in transfers at a given level of income is more
diﬃcult and in some cases may not be desirable. Any retirement system
that requires people to annuitize at a single rate will redistribute from
those with short life expectancy to those with long life expectancy. One
view of this sort of redistribution is that the correlation between income
and life expectancy leads to perverse transfers from lower lifetime-income
groups to higher lifetime-income groups. However, it is also possible to
view people with longer life expectancies as having greater resource needs,
in which case some redistribution to them could be desirable. Although it
is unlikely that the political system would ever explicitly provide higher
beneﬁt levels for groups with lower life expectancy, adding bequest options
similar to the ten-year certain options in private annuity plans would in-
crease transfers to demographic groups with high mortality rates.37 Reduc-
ing transfers between households with working and nonworking spouses
could be accomplished by reducing spouse beneﬁts (for example, by cap-
ping them at 50 percent of the PIA of the average earner) and raising
worker beneﬁts. Alternatively, secondary earners could receive a federal
income tax credit for their payroll taxes at the end of the year. Because
female earnings levels have increased in more recent cohorts, the impor-
tance of spouse beneﬁts will decrease over time, and by some measures
the progressivity of Social Security will increase.
37. If total beneﬁts were held constant, providing bequests would of course require a reduc-
tion in retirement beneﬁt levels.
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Social Security provides income-related transfers that are between 5 and
9p ercent of Social Security beneﬁts paid, or $19 to $34 billion, at 2001
aggregate beneﬁt levels (discounting at the 1.29 percent rate of return on
Social Security earned by the microsimulation sample in this study). How-
ever, the range of transfers received at a given level of average lifetime
income is quite wide. This wide variation is due to diﬀerent mortality rates
for peopleindiﬀerentdemographicgroups,tovariationinearningslevelsby
secondary earners, and to marital status diﬀerences, among other factors.
These results indicate that the income-based redistribution in the cur-
rent Social Security system is fairly modest compared to the total beneﬁts
paid. However, it is worth emphasizing that income redistribution is only
oneo fthe beneﬁts provided by Social Security, and some of the other
beneﬁts—such as the inﬂation-protected annuity and absence of market
risk—may be particularly valuable to low-income families. Therefore,
when we compare alternative systems to the current Social Security sys-
tem, it will be important to determine not only whether they can raise the
incomes and lower the poverty rates of low-income families, but also that
they can provide a comparable amount of income security.38
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Comment Gary Burtless
Jeﬀrey Liebman has written a very lucid, well-conceived, and sensibly exe-
cuted chapter. Although it may not be apparent to most readers, the tabu-
lations he performs are extremely diﬃcult, not least because they are based
on data in a complex ﬁle containing information from both the Survey of
Income and Program Participation ﬁles (SIPP) and Social Security Earn-
ings Records (SSER). These merged records contain conﬁdential earnings
data and are therefore rarely examined by academic researchers. Liebman’s
tabulations shed highly revealing light on some of the important income
redistributive eﬀects of the existing Social Security system.
My remarks will focus on one main question: How should we think
about Liebman’s analytical framework in comparison with other possible
ways of viewing Social Security’s redistributive eﬀects?
The chapter’s basic goal is to uncover the pattern of within-generation
redistribution produced by the Social Security system. In particular, Lieb-
man tries to highlight the pattern of redistributive Social Security impacts
on lifetime or permanent income. Naturally, the ﬁndings of the paper re-
ﬂect the framework in which they are derived. They provide estimates of
redistribution within only one possible framework. Diﬀerent frameworks
would reveal a diﬀerent set of redistributive impacts.
To take a trivial example, Liebman focuses on within-generation redis-
tribution. He could extend the analysis, as many others have done, to ex-
amine the impacts of the system on cross-generational income distribution.
Many critics of Social Security point out that the cross-generational redis-
tribution sometimes beneﬁts the better oﬀ at the expense of the less well
oﬀ.H i gh-income members of generations that receivedg e nerous net trans-
fers from Social Security, especially the generations that began collecting
pensions before 1980, have obtained generous net transfers partly at the
expense of low-income people in generations that will pay net taxes to
Social Security. It is nonetheless the case that the system on average
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tution.provided transfers to earlier and poorer generations at the expense of
later and richer generations. Moving to an advance funded, deﬁned-
contribution system and phasing out the pay-as-you-go system would
eventually eliminate this kind of cross-generational redistribution and,
with it, a type of redistribution that on average has favored the less well
oﬀ. Liebman’s analysis will miss this kind of redistribution.
Liebman could also extend the analysis, as the Oﬃce of the Actuary has
attempted to do, to account for all of the insurance components ﬁnanced
by the OASDI tax. Disability Insurance (DI) and early Survivors Insur-
ance beneﬁts can begin long before age sixty, which is the earliest age at
which the OASDI beneﬁt stream enters Liebman’s calculations. Some
early beneﬁts last long after age sixty, and these, too, are missed in Lieb-
man’s analysis. For example, the DI pension is converted to an Old-Age
Insurance (OAI) pension when the disabled worker reaches the normal
retirement age. The OAI pension is much higher than it would be in the
absence of the DI program, however, because under the regular OAI bene-
ﬁt formula all of the years of postdisability low earnings would be counted
when determining the pension. Simlarly, the survivor’s pension that is
based onaD Ip ension is usually higher than an ordinary survivor’s pen-
sion.A sthe chapter notes in passing, the lifetime redistributive eﬀects of
DI and early survivors’ pensions are much more helpful for people with
low lifetime incomes than are ordinary OAI pensions, which naturally fa-
vorp eople with longer than average life expectancies. Thus, a lifetime
analysis of all the components of OASDI would show redistributive eﬀects
that are much more favorable to people with low permanent income, who
tend to become disabled and leave young survivors much more frequently
than people with high permanent income (see Leimer 1999).
Finally, one can examine the redistributive impacts of Social Security
from a one-year rather than a lifetime perspective. In response to my sug-
gestion at the conference, Liebman has now added a table to the chapter
with some one-year estimates. These estimates provide evidence on ques-
tionss ucha sw hether the people who pay OASDI taxes this year have
higher net incomes than the people who collect this year’s OASDI beneﬁts,
and how much the transfers shift this year’s income distribution. All em-
pirical studies known to me show that Social Security beneﬁts are very
important in reducing the inequality of this year’s income, and Liebman’s
estimates conﬁrm this as well (see Danziger and Weinberg 1994). They are
probably more important, in fact, than the income tax in reducing the
inequality of net income. If we permitted taxpayers to keep their OASDI
taxes and withheld OASDI pensions from current beneﬁciaries, we would
tilt the income distribution in favor of higher-income people and greatly
expand the ranks of the poor. Even though the OASDI payroll tax is often
criticized as regressive, it is progressive up to a family income of about
$100,000 or $125,000 a year, primarily because wage and self-employment
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family income up through those income levels.
Ir ecognize that one-year accounting perspectives are not very fashion-
able in economics. Most of us are conﬁdent that the longer-term (espe-
cially the lifetime) perspective is more illuminating when we think about
income redistribution. The retired seventy-year-old often has less current
income than the working thirty-ﬁve-year-old, but the permanent income
of the seventy-year-old might easily be higher. In a lifetime perspective, it
is bad redistributive policy for the lower-permanent-income thirty-ﬁve-
year-oldt ob et r ansferring resources to the higher-permanent-income
seventy-year-old. (Liebman essentially measures permanent income using
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, or AIME.)
In one sense, this reasoning is beyond reproach, but in another it is
highly misleading. One reason we have a Social Security system is the view
that people will not take sensible precautions to insure themselves against
known risks to themselves and their families—risks such as early death,
disability, retirement, and extremely long life spans. When these risks be-
come realities, many people are caught ﬂat-footed and ﬁnd themselves
with too little savings to support themselves. Social Security requires
workers to purchase insurance that partially protects them against these
risks. The Social Security system imposes taxes on low-permanent-income
thirty-ﬁve-year-olds to ﬁnance transfers to high-permanent-income
seventy-year-olds. The transfers prevent high-permanent-income seventy-
year-olds from becoming low-actual-income seventy-year-olds. To a large
extent, this transfer mechanism succeeds in holding down poverty among
aged and disabled Americans, including retired and disabled Americans
whoh ad middle-class incomes when they were at work. Liebman’s analysis
largely misses this redistributional eﬀecto fSocial Security. It is a view of
redistribution that rests on the plausible but incorrect theory that, in the
absence of Social Security, workers would have successfully smoothed
their consumption over their lifetimes. Many would have smoothed their
consumption, but workers who would have failed to do so are protected
by Social Security.
In interpreting the aggregate amount of redistribution that Liebman
attributes to Social Security, it is important not to make the mistake of
comparing this sum directly to the annual expenditures on other transfer
programs. Consider the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), for example.
Fromalifetime perspective, many EITC recipients have incomes above
the one-year threshold for EITC eligibility, and many of the people who
pay additional income taxes to ﬁnance the EITC, including low-income
childless workers, have incomes below the EITC eligibility threshold. Thus
a sensiblec omparison would require taking the lifetime perspective on
other transfer programs as well.
However, we will move away from the redistributive analyses that Jeﬀ
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is on the within-generation impacts of the system from a truncated lifetime
perspective (truncated because it ignores beneﬁts contributors obtain be-
fore ages ixty). Contributors pay taxes while they are at work and collect
beneﬁts starting some time after age sixty. Liebman can easily calculate
the return workers obtain on their taxes, given a convention for counting
taxes and beneﬁts. In Liebman’s main analysis, if a worker’s return exceeds
her generation’s average, she has obtained a net transfer. If her internal
rate of return falls short of her generation’s average, she has paid net taxes
to the system.
Note that this is a diﬀerent concept of net taxes and transfers than the
onea dopted by Jagadeesh Gokhale and Larry Kotlikoﬀ in another paper
at this conference. They use a benchmark (“fair market”) discounting fac-
tort oassess contributions and beneﬁts. If a worker’s return falls short of
this benchmark, she is classiﬁed as a net taxpayer. Since Gokhale and
Kotlikoﬀ use a benchmark return that is far higher than the average inter-
nal rate of return actually realized on Social Security contributions, they
ﬁnd a much higher percentage of contributors in each generation to be
net taxpayers.
As noted, Liebman must establish a convention for counting a worker’s
taxes and contributions, that is, for assigning total contributions and bene-
ﬁtst oi ndividual workers. Liebman’s convention is to assign to a worker
all the worker’s taxes when she is single and half her contributions when
she is married. In addition, Liebman assigns to a person half the spouse’s
contributions when the person is married. An identical convention is used
to assign beneﬁts to individuals. All of individual i’s beneﬁts when person
i is single, and half the combined husband-wife beneﬁts when person i is
married, are assigned to person i.
This is a straightforward and illuminating way to assign contributions
and beneﬁts, but it is not necessarily compatible with the philosophy be-
hind the program. Social Security sometimes bases a person’s beneﬁts on
the person’s own earnings record and sometimes on the earnings record of
another family member. The architects seem to have had in mind an insur-
ance scheme in which contributors earned rights to beneﬁts under desig-
nated circumstances (insurable events). When a sixty-one-year-old married
contributor is taken to the undertaker, he bequeaths beneﬁt entitlements to
speciﬁed dependents (including his spouse). Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Congress probably believed the stream of beneﬁts ﬂowing to the contribu-
tor’s survivors was generated by the earlier stream of contributions made
by the deceased worker. In the example I have just given, however, Lieb-
man would assign one-half the worker’s tax contributions and none of the
beneﬁts to the deceased worker and assign one-half the tax contributions
and all of the beneﬁts to the surviving spouse. This procedure will obvi-
ously produce large and apparently capricious redistribution between
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return for longer-lived spouses. The variance of returns would be enor-
mous if Liebman had tabulated the actual beneﬁt streams of people in his
sample, since variations in mortality experience would lead to wide varia-
tion in lifetime beneﬁts, but he instead tabulates individuals’ expected ben-
eﬁt streams.
UnlessIhave overlooked something, however, a conceptual problem
remains. The worker’s contributions produce a set of beneﬁt entitlements,
some ofw h i ch ﬂow to the worker and some of which ﬂow to the worker’s
surviving dependents. The expected beneﬁts that go to a surviving depen-
dent after the contributor has died do not appear as “returns” to the con-
tributor, even though they are part of the entitlements that the contribu-
tor’s taxes have purchased.
We could view contributions and beneﬁts in a diﬀerent way than does
Liebman. All the beneﬁts that ﬂow from a Social Security earnings record,
whether received by the contributor or his surviving dependents, could be
assigned to that Social Security contributor. This alternative framework
would certainly lift the measured internal rate of return on men’s Social
Security taxes and reduce the apparent return on women’s taxes. I do not
think this alternative procedure should be preferred to the one Liebman
uses, but it is the framework implicitly used by many women’s groups who
criticize the antifemale bias of the Social Security system. They correctly
point out that the current system does not give full credit to the OASDI
contributions of working wives who are secondary family earners. On the
margin, such earners receive little or no extra OASDI beneﬁts for their
contributions, because the family’s main retirement and survivors’ beneﬁt
will be determined by the earnings record of the higher-earning spouse.
From this perspective, men’s contributions are producing a higher rate of
return than women’s, exactly the opposite conclusion from the one reached
in this chapter.
While I think that Liebman’s procedure is sensible and informative, it
should be clear that a diﬀerent convention for assigning taxes and beneﬁts
would have produced sharply diﬀering results. For many critics of Social
Security (although not for me), the alternative convention seems more
meaningful than the one adopted by Liebman.
Since Liebman emphasizes the perverse eﬀect of spouse beneﬁts on re-
distribution, I want to conclude with a brief discussion of those beneﬁts.
It seems to me that the architects of Social Security had in mind a society
in which each family was mainly supported by one breadwinner and all
men and women mated for life. They designed an old-age and survivors’
program that attempted to oﬀer “adequate” beneﬁts at the least possible
cost. Thus, they did not give large payments to the estates of contributors
whodiedyoung,unlessthedeceasedcontributorsleftsurvivingdependents.
Social Security’s architects obviously thought it cost 50 percent more to
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for Social Security thus purchased a pension that was 50 percent larger if
two people survived or, equivalently, a pension 33 percent smaller if just
onep erson survived. Suppose instead that the architects had chosen to
give individual pensions without dependent spouse supplements. To assure
that surviving couples had large enough pensions to support themselves
comfortably, the basic pension would have had to be higher than the one
provided to single survivors under the current system. The higher basic
pensions in turn would have required a higher contribution rate. From the
point of view of holding down program cost, a system with no dependent
spouse beneﬁt supplements would have provided “wastefully” high ben-
eﬁts to surviving single people. Given the rise in women’s labor force par-
ticipation and expected lifetime earnings, the original design of spouse
beneﬁts now seems misconceived and leads to capricious and sometimes
regressive redistribution. Liebman suggests a sensible strategy for limiting
the cost of spouse supplements and improving the redistributive impact of
the system: Put a ﬂat cap on dependent spouse monthly beneﬁts.
It seems to me, however, that the design of spousal and survivor beneﬁts
provides real insurance to workers that Liebman’s analysis may miss. He
takes the perspective of people who have already survived to age sixty and
know whether they will enter old age as a single person or as part of a
married couple. At that point, workers’ marital statuses already largely
determine whether they will be advantaged or disadvantaged under the
OAIa nd survivors’ program. Women, especially secondary earner married
women, can expect to receive large beneﬁts relative to their contributions;
men and single women can expect to be far less favorably treated. People
whoe n ter old age as single people are doomed to obtain the modest rate
of return that their marital status automatically produces under Social Se-
curity.
However, at age sixteen or twenty this outcome could not have been
foreseen, or it would have been just one of several possibleo utcomes. At
that early age, the person would reasonably think he or she could marry,
that the (unknown) marriage partner could earn substantially more or less
than oneself, that the marriage partner could remain alive until old age.
All of the possible beneﬁt entitlements that ﬂow out of these events would
have entered into the individual’s assessment of the expected returns ob-
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1. In this they disagreed with the analysts who developed the oﬃcial U.S. poverty thresh-
olds. The poverty thresholds imply that it costs just 26 percent more to support an aged
couple than an aged single person. This simple diﬀerence between the implicit equivalence
scales in Social Security (and other beneﬁt programs) and the poverty thresholds explains
much of the diﬀerence in poverty rates between the elderly in married-couple and single-
person households. Liebman does not make a family-size correction in computing the perma-
nent incomes (AIMEs) of individuals included in his analysis. Thus, couples and single
people with the same AIME are treated as having an equivalent position in the income distri-
bution.tainable under Social Security. What looks like a bad deal at age sixty-
two, when a person enters old age without a living marriage partner, might
have seemed like a much more attractive proposition at age twenty-two,
whenah appy marriage with a long-lived partner was still a real possibility.
An important question, then, is whether it is enough to analyze the dis-
tributional consequences of Social Security for people who have already
experiencedm osto fthe marital status changes they will experience over
their lifetimes. Or should we instead take the perspective of workers at,
say, age sixteen, before the full sequence of marriage spells and widowhood
is known? My guess is that a large number of well-informed sixteen-year-
olds would ﬁnd Social Security insurance valuable, even though at age
sixty they will sensibly conclude it provided them with a bad deal—be-
cause they have no surviving spouse.
Let me emphasize, however, that I ﬁnd Liebman’s analytical framework
and tabulations illuminating and helpful. Their limitations are those of all
such tabulations: They provide just one kind of assessment of the redistri-
bution produced by the system. A diﬀerent framework would provide a
diﬀerent—although not necessarily a better—assessment.
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Discussion Summary
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ questioned the large amount of dispersion in ex-
pected beneﬁts for people with the same lifetime income. The author indi-
cated that this dispersion is caused by a variety of factors including diﬀer-
ential ex ante mortality, spousal beneﬁts, and the timing of income.
Stephen Zeldes wasc oncerned about the net present value calculations.
Since the author used the average cohort rate of return instead of the sig-
niﬁcantly larger market-based rate of return to determine the net present
value of beneﬁts, Zeldes said there might be very diﬀerent answers about
the progressivity of the system if alternative rates of return were con-
sidered.
Because the marginal utility of income for the poor is so much higher
than the marginal utility of income for the wealthy, Jonathan Skinner
Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System 47thought the paper’s conclusions might be completely diﬀerent if the utility
value of redistribution were analyzed, rather than just the dollar amount
of redistribution. The author agreed with this assessment and noted that
it might be important to take into account the value of insurance provision
as well as weigh the dollar amounts of redistribution diﬀerently at various
levels of the income distribution.
Several participants believed that the heterogeneous mortality experi-
ences seen in historical data would not have as strong an impact in the
future. However, the author said that it was not at all clear that mortality
rates will converge in the future and pointed to actuarial forecasts implying
ar elatively constant gap between the life expectancies of men and women
and to evidence from the 1960s to the mid-1980s indicating that over that
period the morality experience of blacks and whites failed to converge.
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